奇爱博士

(PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORKER, BY ERIC SCHLOSSER, ON JANUARY 23, 2014)

This month marks the fiftieth anniversary of Stanley Kubrick’s black comedy about nuclear weapons, “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.” Released on January 29, 1964, the film caused a good deal of controversy. Its plot suggested that a mentally deranged American general could order a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, without consulting the President. One reviewer described the film as “dangerous … an evil thing about an evil thing.” Another compared it to Soviet propaganda. Although “Strangelove” was clearly a farce, with the comedian Peter Sellers playing three roles, it was criticized for being implausible. An expert at the Institute for Strategic Studies called the events in the film “impossible on a dozen counts.” A former Deputy Secretary of Defense dismissed the idea that someone could authorize the use of a nuclear weapon without the President’s approval: “Nothing, in fact, could be further from the truth.” (See a compendium of clips from the film.) When “Fail-Safe”—a Hollywood thriller with a similar plot, directed by Sidney Lumet—opened, later that year, it was criticized in much the same way. “The incidents in ‘Fail-Safe’ are deliberate lies!” General Curtis LeMay, the Air Force chief of staff, said. “Nothing like that could happen.” The first casualty of every war is the truth—and the Cold War was no exception to that dictum. Half a century after Kubrick’s mad general, Jack D. Ripper, launched a nuclear strike on the Soviets to defend the purity of “our precious bodily fluids” from Communist subversion, we now know that American officers did indeed have the ability to start a Third World War on their own. And despite the introduction of rigorous safeguards in the years since then, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation hasn’t been completely eliminated.

The command and control of nuclear weapons has long been plagued by an “always/never” dilemma. The administrative and technological systems that are necessary to insure that nuclear weapons are always available for use in wartime may be quite different from those necessary to guarantee that such weapons can never be used, without proper authorization, in peacetime. During the nineteen-fifties and sixties, the “always” in American war planning was given far greater precedence than the “never.” Through two terms in office, beginning in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower struggled with this dilemma. He wanted to retain Presidential control of nuclear weapons while defending America and its allies from attack. But, in a crisis, those two goals might prove contradictory, raising all sorts of difficult questions. What if Soviet bombers were en route to the United States but the President somehow couldn’t be reached? What if Soviet tanks were rolling into West Germany but a communications breakdown prevented NATO officers from contacting the White House? What if the President were killed during a surprise attack on Washington, D.C., along with the rest of the nation’s civilian leadership? Who would order a nuclear retaliation then?

With great reluctance, Eisenhower agreed to let American officers use their nuclear weapons, in an emergency, if there were no time or no means to contact the President. Air Force pilots were allowed to fire their nuclear anti-aircraft rockets to shoot down Soviet bombers heading toward the United States. And about half a dozen high-level American commanders were allowed to use far more powerful nuclear weapons, without contacting the White House first, when their forces were under attack and “the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead.” Eisenhower worried that providing that sort of authorization in advance could make it possible for someone to do “something foolish down the chain of command” and start an all-out nuclear war. But the alternative—allowing an attack on the United States to go unanswered or NATO forces to be overrun—seemed a lot worse. Aware that his decision might create public unease about who really controlled America’s nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower insisted that his delegation of Presidential authority be kept secret. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he confessed to being “very fearful of having written papers on this matter.”

President John F. Kennedy was surprised to learn, just a few weeks after taking office, about this secret delegation of power. “A subordinate commander faced with a substantial military action,” Kennedy was told in a top-secret memo, “could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you.” Kennedy and his national-security advisers were shocked not only by the wide latitude given to American officers but also by the loose custody of the roughly three thousand American nuclear weapons stored in Europe. Few of the weapons had locks on them. Anyone who got hold of them could detonate them. And there was little to prevent NATO officers from Turkey, Holland, Italy, Great Britain, and Germany from using them without the approval of the United States.

In December, 1960, fifteen members of Congress serving on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had toured NATO bases to investigate how American nuclear weapons were being deployed. They found that the weapons—some of them about a hundred times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima—were routinely guarded, transported, and handled by foreign military personnel. American control of the weapons was practically nonexistent. Harold Agnew, a Los Alamos physicist who accompanied the group, was especially concerned to see German pilots sitting in German planes that were decorated with Iron Crosses—and carrying American atomic bombs. Agnew, in his own words, “nearly wet his pants” when he realized that a lone American sentry with a rifle was all that prevented someone from taking off in one of those planes and bombing the Soviet Union.

* * *
The Kennedy Administration soon decided to put locking devices inside NATO’s nuclear weapons. The coded electromechanical switches, known as “permissive action links” (PALs), would be placed on the arming lines. The weapons would be inoperable without the proper code—and that code would be shared with NATO allies only when the White House was prepared to fight the Soviets. The American military didn’t like the idea of these coded switches, fearing that mechanical devices installed to improve weapon safety would diminish weapon reliability. A top-secret State Department memo summarized the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961: “all is well with the atomic stockpile program and there is no need for any changes.”

After a crash program to develop the new control technology, during the mid-nineteen-sixties, permissive action links were finally placed inside most of the nuclear weapons deployed by NATO forces. But Kennedy’s directive applied only to the NATO arsenal. For years, the Air Force and the Navy blocked attempts to add coded switches to the weapons solely in their custody. During a national emergency, they argued, the consequences of not receiving the proper code from the White House might be disastrous. And locked weapons might play into the hands of Communist saboteurs. “The very existence of the lock capability,” a top Air Force general claimed, “would create a fail-disable potential for knowledgeable agents to ‘dud’ the entire Minuteman [missile] force.” The Joint Chiefs thought that strict military discipline was the best safeguard against an unauthorized nuclear strike. A two-man rule was instituted to make it more difficult for someone to use a nuclear weapon without permission. And a new screening program, the Human Reliability Program, was created to stop people with emotional, psychological, and substance-abuse problems from gaining access to nuclear weapons.

Despite public assurances that everything was fully under control, in the winter of 1964, while “Dr. Strangelove” was playing in theatres and being condemned as Soviet propaganda, there was nothing to prevent an American bomber crew or missile launch crew from using their weapons against the Soviets. Kubrick had researched the subject for years, consulted experts, and worked closely with a former R.A.F. pilot, Peter George, on the screenplay of the film. George’s novel about the risk of accidental nuclear war, “Red Alert,” was the source for most of “Strangelove” ’s plot. Unbeknownst to both Kubrick and George, a top official at the Department of Defense had already sent a copy of “Red Alert” to every member of the Pentagon’s Scientific Advisory Committee for Ballistic Missiles. At the Pentagon, the book was taken seriously as a cautionary tale about what might go wrong. Even Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara privately worried that an accident, a mistake, or a rogue American officer could start a nuclear war.

Coded switches to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons were finally added to the control systems of American missiles and bombers in the early nineteen-seventies. The Air Force was not pleased, and considered the new security measures to be an insult, a lack of confidence in its personnel. Although the Air Force now denies this claim, according to more than one source I contacted, the code necessary to launch a missile was set to be the same at every Minuteman site: 00000000.

* * *
The early permissive action links were rudimentary. Placed in NATO weapons during the nineteen-sixties and known as Category A PALs, the switches relied on a split four-digit code, with ten thousand possible combinations. If the United States went to war, two people would be necessary to unlock a nuclear weapon, each of them provided with half the code. Category A PALs were useful mainly to delay unauthorized use, to buy time after a weapon had been taken or to thwart an individual psychotic hoping to cause a large explosion. A skilled technician could open a stolen weapon and unlock it within a few hours. Today’s Category D PALs, installed in the Air Force’s hydrogen bombs, are more sophisticated. They require a six-digit code, with a million possible combinations, and have a limited-try feature that disables a weapon when the wrong code is repeatedly entered.

The Air Force’s land-based Minuteman III missiles and the Navy’s submarine-based Trident II missiles now require an eight-digit code—which is no longer 00000000—in order to be launched. The Minuteman crews receive the code via underground cables or an aboveground radio antenna. Sending the launch code to submarines deep underwater presents a greater challenge. Trident submarines contain two safes. One holds the keys necessary to launch a missile; the other holds the combination to the safe with the keys; and the combination to the safe holding the combination must be transmitted to the sub by very-low-frequency or extremely-low-frequency radio. In a pinch, if Washington, D.C., has been destroyed and the launch code doesn’t arrive, the sub’s crew can open the safes with a blowtorch.

The security measures now used to control America’s nuclear weapons are a vast improvement over those of 1964. But, like all human endeavors, they are inherently flawed. The Department of Defense’s Personnel Reliability Program is supposed to keep people with serious emotional or psychological issues away from nuclear weapons—and yet two of the nation’s top nuclear commanders were recently removed from their posts. Neither appears to be the sort of calm, stable person you want with a finger on the button. In fact, their misbehavior seems straight out of “Strangelove.”

Vice Admiral Tim Giardina, the second-highest-ranking officer at the U.S. Strategic Command—the organization responsible for all of America’s nuclear forces—-was investigated last summer for allegedly using counterfeit gambling chips at the Horseshoe Casino in Council Bluffs, Iowa. According to the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, “a significant monetary amount” of counterfeit chips was involved. Giardina was relieved of his command on October 3, 2013. A few days later, Major General Michael Carey, the Air Force commander in charge of America’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, was fired for conduct “unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.” According to a report by the Inspector General of the Air Force, Carey had consumed too much alcohol during an official trip to Russia, behaved rudely toward Russian officers, spent time with “suspect” young foreign women in Moscow, loudly discussed sensitive information in a public hotel lounge there, and drunkenly pleaded to get onstage and sing with a Beatles cover band at La Cantina, a Mexican restaurant near Red Square. Despite his requests, the band wouldn’t let Carey onstage to sing or to play the guitar.

While drinking beer in the executive lounge at Moscow’s Marriott Aurora during that visit, General Carey made an admission with serious public-policy implications. He off-handedly told a delegation of U.S. national-security officials that his missile-launch officers have the “worst morale in the Air Force.” Recent events suggest that may be true. In the spring of 2013, nineteen launch officers at Minot Air Force base in North Dakota were decertified for violating safety rules and poor discipline. In August, 2013, the entire missile wing at Malmstrom Air Force base in Montana failed its safety inspection. Last week, the Air Force revealed that thirty-four launch officers at Malmstrom had been decertified for cheating on proficiency exams—and that at least three launch officers are being investigated for illegal drug use. The findings of a report by the RAND Corporation, leaked to the A.P., were equally disturbing. The study found that the rates of spousal abuse and court martials among Air Force personnel with nuclear responsibilities are much higher than those among people with other jobs in the Air Force. “We don’t care if things go properly,” a launch officer told RAND. “We just don’t want to get in trouble.”

The most unlikely and absurd plot element in “Strangelove” is the existence of a Soviet “Doomsday Machine.” The device would trigger itself, automatically, if the Soviet Union were attacked with nuclear weapons. It was meant to be the ultimate deterrent, a threat to destroy the world in order to prevent an American nuclear strike. But the failure of the Soviets to tell the United States about the contraption defeats its purpose and, at the end of the film, inadvertently causes a nuclear Armageddon. “The whole point of the Doomsday Machine is lost,” Dr. Strangelove, the President’s science adviser, explains to the Soviet Ambassador, “if you keep it a secret!”

A decade after the release of “Strangelove,” the Soviet Union began work on the Perimeter system—-a network of sensors and computers that could allow junior military officials to launch missiles without oversight from the Soviet leadership. Perhaps nobody at the Kremlin had seen the film. Completed in 1985, the system was known as the Dead Hand. Once it was activated, Perimeter would order the launch of long-range missiles at the United States if it detected nuclear detonations on Soviet soil and Soviet leaders couldn’t be reached. Like the Doomsday Machine in “Strangelove,” Perimeter was kept secret from the United States; its existence was not revealed until years after the Cold War ended.

In retrospect, Kubrick’s black comedy provided a far more accurate description of the dangers inherent in nuclear command-and-control systems than the ones that the American people got from the White House, the Pentagon, and the mainstream media.

“This is absolute madness, Ambassador,” President Merkin Muffley says in the film, after being told about the Soviets’ automated retaliatory system. “Why should you build such a thing?” Fifty years later, that question remains unanswered, and “Strangelove” seems all the more brilliant, bleak, and terrifyingly on the mark.



___________________________________


AND THIS IS REALLY COOL:
Top secret documents released by the Pentagon:
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/primary-sources-permissive-action-links-and-the-threat-of-nuclear-war.html

看着最后歌曲声中的核爆，我起先是笑，然后是一阵莫名的忧伤，刺得眼睛酸痛。讽刺是为了把悲伤笑出来，这种悲伤，是刻在人们心底的无奈。拥有等于被拥有，我们拥有了可以毁灭自身的武器，而这些武器拥有了我们。

此考并不完全，也不知库布里克是否有此意，如果有，那庆幸鄙人尝试去猜了，如果没有，喂，这也太巧合了吧。

Group Captain Lionel Mandrake
Mandrake在植物上名为风茄，也就是哈利波特中出现的曼德拉草，形状奇特，阿拉伯人称之为“妖魔的蛋”，在希伯来语中意为“爱的植物”，在某些亚洲文化中，人们相信风茄有使妇女受孕的功能，直白点就是春药、怀胎药。此处为男性生殖隐喻。

President Merkin Muffley
Muffed：To screw something up
在粗俗语言中指妓女、阴户，或二椅子。

General ‘Buck’Turgidson
Buck
1.v: slang for the act of fighting
2.v: slang for disagree'ing and feeling angry towards something
3.n: slang for a young black man
4.n: a male deer
5.n: slang for money
指打斗行为、暴力、年轻黑人男性、雄鹿、钱
此词真乃是赤裸裸的雄性特征
Turgidson
Turgid意思为肿胀，son这词儿大家都认识，此姓意为勃起的生殖器。

rigadier General Jack Ripper
Jack Ripper一说，只能联想到Jack the Ripper，大名鼎鼎的开膛手杰克，他于1888年8月7日到11月9日期间，在伦敦东区（East End of London）的白教堂（Whitechapel）一带，以残忍手法连续杀害至少五名妓女的凶手。死者的遗体显示受害者喉咙被割开，死后腹部往往被剖开，部分受害者甚至外阴被凶手切下。

Major 'King' Kong
金刚，雄性特征还用提吗

Russian Ambassador Alexi de Sadesky
Sadesky来源于Sade，和萨德挂钩的除了“性虐待”以外还有什么好词儿么

Dr. Strangelove
对战争、毁灭、破坏、野心、阴谋这些畸形的爱

昨晚又温习了一遍此片（我的硬盘长期保留此片），再次证明了我的猜想。
片子的主体基本是主题政治荒诞剧，有反战因素，但又不可否认它的主题多元性，否则有很多场景、情节就难以解释。

主题多元性点滴，想到哪里写到哪里．

1、雄性暗示
　　片头介绍了末日装置的传言，就是轰炸飞机空中加油的特写，音乐是柔情的缠绵绵的，这里是个性行为暗示，看了片子画面你就懂了。
机长姓KONG，英语不好的不要怪我，这个姓在英语世界里只有大猩猩用过，还是雄性的象征。
　　机长骑着2000万吨级核弹兴奋的落向苏联的导弹工厂，胯下的2000万吨级核弹也是一个勃起象征。
　　还有很多，比如狂人瑞披的关于性的“精华”谈论，巴克将军对奇爱的1：10男女婚姻比例的向往和遐想……
　　雄性=暴力毁坏力+性欲求
　　这类暗示很多，自己去看吧

2、国家的军事化和最终纳粹化
　　奇爱原是德国人（他的原型里可能有德裔物理学家奥托·汉因和弗里茨·施特拉斯曼的因素），如果你不知道这两个家伙是谁，自己就别自以为自己能很懂这个片子，想理解影片内涵的人要需要大致和导演相似的知识背景，这是必须的嘛。
现在他已经从纳粹科学家，经肮脏的“洗白”归化程序，而成为美国核战争的技术总负责人，鉴于核武器的特殊用途，他同时也是总统的冷战战略顾问，出席最高军事会议。而且，最后核战危机不可收拾的时刻，全体官僚、将军都要问计于他！这里的暗示已经很清楚。
注意片子对博士身体上设置的几个暗喻。
1. 他的那个假肢右臂，力量强大但又难以自制，时时忍不住行纳粹军礼，时时想扼死自己。（这是一个暗喻，手臂指什么？）
2. 在提出核战末日应对预案时，博士的兴奋胜于恐惧，甚至兴奋得忘乎所以，语无伦次，声音高吭而颤抖，竟几次错误地把总统称为“我的元首！”（这是一个暗喻，元首指什么？）
3. 这个依靠轮椅行动的瘫子，竟然神迹般的站了起来，（这里很可能反用了圣经），见马太福音第9章经文：9：2 有人用褥子抬着一个瘫子，到耶稣跟前来。耶稣见他们的信心，就对瘫子说，小子，放心吧。你的罪赦了。 此经常规的解释见 http://www.hislambs.net/axr/luguang/jdj1-26.htm
注意，片子最后一句对白也是博士以兴奋、扭曲甚至有些许恐怖声音说：“我的元首，我，我站起来了！”这是一个暗喻，瘫子和站立指什么？）

　　奇爱博士这个人物的设定，实际是说：冷战下的美国不仅要依靠纳粹军事科技，还必须依靠纳粹政治思维才能生存下去。如同片中，奇爱博士不只提供核威慑的技术性咨询，最后还为总统及全体官僚提出了一个核战后“矿井社会”荒谬的整体社会规划！换句话说，纳粹主义已经在冷战阴影下慢慢复活了——瘫子最终神迹般的站了起来就是一种象征。（个人观点，未经导演本人确认呵呵）

３、口是心非的冷战式“和平”
片子里有个诙谐戏剧因素，口口声声标榜倾向和平的人们实际上都是大战争贩子，这些情节另片子长生了很不错的幽默效果。比如，
　　满嘴外交辞令、装的一本三正经的的苏联大使阁下，实际上是个兼职窃照特务，而且窃照职业病还控制不住，偷拍成癖；
　　战略值班轰炸机基地是保证美国毁灭红色世界（当然地球也会全毁）的最后保证，基地的宣传栏却大书：我们的职业是和平；
　　属于人民的苏共总理，命令设计了被动式引爆的末日装置，敌人的任何核攻击会启动这个地球的毁灭，且污染物持续１００年。值得玩味的，美国人听到这消息几乎没有人恐惧，而是把它归为讹诈伎俩。
　　总统的电话，为了解释误会，大说“扫瑞”那段，几乎成了中国相声。
　　巴克将军是口是心非冷战式“和平”的集中表演者，他给总统汇报瑞皮发了疯擅自发动Ｒ计划时，大家可以看到他实际上是兴奋得不能自制，但在总统面前还要板着脸悔过这次指挥“失误”。说了没一会儿，就转到了怂恿总统将计就计、全面进攻苏联的新话题了。当全部飞机召回，可怜的巴克选入了深深的失望，但苏共总理抗议有一架漏网时，他几乎高兴得手舞足蹈：太妙了，又可以毁灭苏联——全部公产主义——以及整个地球了！！！

　（P.S.鸟笼山的傻大木台词，也有异曲同工之妙：“等我把地球毁灭了，我给你们发奖金！” 真可媲美了。）　


4.敌意+封闭+疯狂=冷战式隔阂

影片的故事发生地主要有三处:
一是美国国防部作战室;高不见顶的巨大黑暗空间，只有聚光灯下巨大的会议圆桌前一张张政要的面孔，以及那幅大板苏联地图;
二是KONG机长的B-52轰炸机座舱、控制室和炸弹舱，一派性质盎然的节日气氛;
三是空军基地的外景和办公室内景。
片子一开始。三者之间据不再有沟通关系，各行其是，因为打冷战、怕窃听、反间谍、被敌人干扰一系列专业味道十足的理由，封闭了几乎所有的沟通渠道。
即使在每一个场景内，人与人之间也难以沟通。驰援机场的小队被守军无情的伏击，是为了防止俄军冒充偷袭；面对英国副手，瑞皮语言时而大谈其“体液哲学”，时而不着边际，时而疯人疯语；作战室里的热线电话打嘴架，军事官僚们对总统的战争诱惑、话题转移，与苏联大使的斗嘴和扭打。

库布里克运用“隔阂”来叙事，在讲不清道理的困境中，将道理讲清了，呵呵，形成了独特的叙事风格。


5。角色七人谈

彼得在片子里一人演三角

第一个是美国空军基地司令副官曼德里克，典型文职英国空军，娘娘腔，有些雌化，总把绅士文雅字眼挂嘴上，这一副手也恰恰符合了冷战形势中“英国是美国的跟班"的说法。曼德里克再美国老大面前很胆小，软弱，温顺，显得有些，但是骨子里还是有点小倔强、责任感的，这个小人物似乎比那些大人物们要更人性一些。

第二个是戴眼镜、大秃顶的美国总统，思维有些乱，说话有点飘，片中给他个人的头部特写镜头几乎没有，总都是把他“淹没”在一群政客幕僚的簇拥之中，大厅的黑暗更显得他渺小、不重要。也许是表现，他不过是一个职业政客身份特征，刻画出了他毫无主见。

第三个是奇爱博士，核心人物，一个笑容略带智慧、轻蔑与滑稽的核战策划家。虽然是坐着轮椅残疾人（暗喻遭到重创的纳粹主义），但是他和伟大的纳粹元首一样，长于演说鼓动、感情丰富、易激动、动作幅度特别大、时不时地习惯性抽动僵硬的躯体，满天吐沫星子的大谈其末日设想，给人的印象绝对的深刻。这个人物在影片中的显得非常突兀抢眼，他究竟代表着什么呢，也许他并不代表着某个人，应该是代表冷战、核战的精神源头。

这三个人，你看得出来都是一个演员演得么？向老库致敬吧各位

第四个是空军基地司令瑞皮，意识形态中毒深重的战争狂人，注意，导演多次用仰角镜头拍摄他的脸部特色，那根大雪茄不正代表着他的雄型勃起么。

第五个，轰炸机指挥官“刚”少校，又是个意识形态中毒深重的战争狂人，他切断一切与外界的联系，开始兴奋，发表激进的演说来激励下属，最后骑着核弹头兴奋呼叫着，掉下去实现了他的核战英雄梦

第六个，巴克将军似乎对和平不关心，还是个意识形态中毒深重的战争狂人，当然对女人除外，他对性感的女秘书竟然说着儿语调情。但是一旦得知事态的严重，他慌神得比谁都厉害，在作战室内的滑稽举动，他不是不安，而是内心兴奋与激动，和“刚”少校不相上下。


第七个，巴克的女秘书兼情人，这是片中唯一的女人，所以不得不提，出现的场景极其有限，基本就是个花瓶。政治与女人无关，但是与性有关。看看不多的几个镜头的色情味，难道还不够性暗示么？

2010.5.31再次修改

库布里克，很善于玩转黑色幽默。

电影《光荣之路》中，法国陆军将军下达了一个士兵们根本无法完成的任务，当任务失败，士兵撤退时，这位将军痛下黑手，准备让没有吃到德国枪子儿的士兵，尝尝法国的枪子儿。

《全金属外壳》里，士兵小丑头上写着“天生杀手”，胸前别着“和平印章”的行为艺术装扮，是库布里克对美国越战赤裸而无情的讽刺。

这两部电影中，处处可见黑色幽默。而真正让库布里克成为黑色幽默大师的，是《奇爱博士》。

这部被称为库布里克“未来三部曲”之一的电影，表达了库布里克对人类未来的基本看法：人类的未来就是没有未来 。

1964年，电影上映，冷战还未结束，库布里克送去了一份礼物，在此之前还从未有人敢如此戏弄战争。

一、

美苏两大阵营冷战时期，美国空军基地的一位空军将军突然下达命令，启动R计划，34架携带数千万吨核弹的飞机进攻苏联。（相当于整个二战期间核弹量的11倍）

这意味将爆发一场核战争。

这位瑞皮将军，是私自下达命令的，并切断了和华盛顿总部的一切通讯设备，事前他没有报告他的上级图吉德森将军，更没有经过总统的签字。

他疯了吗？为什么这么做呢。

原来这位看着强悍高大，嘴里喜欢叼着雪茄的将军，性生活有问题，所以他不能征服女人，就要用炮弹征服世界，推行极端的种族主义。

他这一点倒是很像那位发动第二次世界大战的元首希特勒，

于是乎，瑞皮将军因为自己的隐疾，把冷战变成热战，第三次世界大战一触即发。

二、

得知这一消息的图吉德森将军，并没有显示出生气和惊讶，因为此时他还在跟他的女秘书打情骂俏。

等他在作战室平淡的把这一信息告诉总统梅尔金时，总统慌了。而他依然像个没事人一样若无其事，甚至还接到女秘书打来的一通抱怨电话，在核武器准备进攻苏联的时候，他还在安抚女友的情绪，许诺将来一定将她扶正。

同时，也可以看出，图吉德森将军是一个好战分子。对于阻止这一行动，他向总统表示无计可施。对于先发制人，进攻苏联，他倒是激情四射。

三、

当梅尔金总统电话告知苏联总理时，这位总理喝的醉醺醺的，像个女人一样喋喋不休的闹情绪。

此时，苏联大使透漏一个惊天秘闻：只要苏联遭到进攻，会立即启动“世界末日机器”，可以毁灭地球上所有生物和人类。

作为美国战略顾问的奇爱博士，这种机器是电脑程序设定好的，一旦有人想关闭它，它就会自动爆炸。

这位奇爱博士本来就是德国人，曾经为纳粹服务，二战后移民美国。虽然改名换姓，依然遏制不住心中的法西斯情节，身残志坚的致力于摧毁这个世界。

核弹在苏联基地爆炸后，奇爱博士提出了一项“人类精英计划“：从数十亿人口选中几十万人藏于深埋地下的矿井中，等到百年后，核污染散去，才重返陆上。

这位坐着轮椅的奇爱博士，每次说到激动点的时候，他总会脱口而出，大喊“我的元首”。更为滑稽的是，他的右臂会不受控制的自动行“纳粹礼”。

当奇爱博士提到“人类精英计划”中的男女比例是1:10时，在场的男士们沸腾了，因为这将意味着人类将取消“一夫一妻制”，连苏联大使都称赞这是好主意。而最兴奋的莫过于图吉德森将军，他听的两眼发光，也许他和女秘书之间的秘密情史终于可以正大光明的进行了。

四、

一场毁灭人类的核武器大战爆发，而并没有人真正关心。

整个统治世界的男人们，不是吃着口香糖想女人，就是想着如何尽快行动，如何尽快占领地下矿井，好在下一轮的两大阵营的对立面中占据优势。

最后，奇爱博士，再次想出一个绝妙计划的时候，残疾的双腿竟然奇迹般的站起来了，这是是一个巨大的隐喻：意味着纳粹重生。

其实奇爱博士、瑞皮将军、图吉德森将军，他们是三位一体的，他们是战争的设计者、发起者、受益者。世界是他们的，而游戏规则从未变过。

撕下文明的外衣，库布里克表示，人类的未来就是没有未来。

喜欢，请关注“时空记1994”，不定期更新影评、书评、乐评。

在谈电影之前，先聊口香糖。

口香糖在二战时期便和罐头、牛肉干一样，作为一种重要的军用物资配给给军队，它具有防止瞌睡、缓解压力、清洁牙齿、填补油箱、保持注意力的奇妙效用，广受狙击手和空军大兵的欢迎。

而其中不得不提及的便是箭牌口香糖，当时箭牌厂商几乎把所有的产能都供给到了军方，也被美国大兵带向了欧美的广阔市场，这为箭牌口香糖在战后的兴盛打下基础。

就是这样一款和二战千丝万缕的物品在库布里克的《奇爱博士》中，得到了大量的应用，作为一种二战标志性物件的奇妙点缀，我们不妨来看几个例子：

1.绿箭口香糖的死忠粉——General Turgidson

影片中第一处绿箭口香糖的踪迹出现在25分58秒，托德森将军（Buck）将第一片口香糖拨开糖纸（左下角《War Alert Action Book》左边便是一张拨开的糖纸，而桌上已经有三四团像是吃完的口香糖的坨状物），然后将其缓缓对折，尔后张口伸舌吞入，他之后吃口香糖都是以这样的方式吃的。从他放在桌上的包装可以辨认，这跟我小时候吃的绿箭牌口香糖并无多少出入。值得一提的是，Buck一旦吞入口香糖以后，他的发音就变得特别有弹性，更具表现张力，更像是Nazi本人，在对于人命的轻佻草芥视之上也变得更加欠揍。

有趣的是画面转向总统之后再聚焦于Buck之时，桌上的口香糖包装便只剩下糖衣了，他吃口香糖的速度着实惊人，这里可能是为了铺衬人物内心的紧张与无所适从，毕竟这是一种与战争休戚相关的味道。事实上，如果读者能联想起口香糖在口腔中拧巴的感受，是不难理解这个道具对于紧张气氛的暗示作用的。

另一方面，自从吃了绿箭口香糖之后，Buck的五官面庞无论说话与否，都在咀嚼的速律下自如地扭动起来，加强了他具有魔性的表现力，也带着十足的轻佻与不屑，口香糖仿佛成为了Buck的另一根舌头，与他嘴中的另一根一样巧舌如簧，伸缩自如，却毫不负责，甚至泯灭人性。

28分11秒时，他又在镜头前吞下了第二根口香糖，以一种十分镇定雄辩的政客姿态，可见其十足的虚伪。

30分29秒，Buck在被总统软弱无力地指责之后，以吞下第三根的方式发泄其明面上的不爽。

当他的性感女秘书打来电话时，我们可以清楚地看到桌上洒落的糖纸，他吃得是真的快。

Buck的演员斯科特的面部特征本来就比较魔性了，配上口香糖的加持，使得他的面部特征（欲吞不吞，欲嚼还咽）时常成为影片中一道怡情的靓丽风景。

2.飞行员的常备良品——Survival kit contents check

在飞机急救包的点数过程中，除了尼龙袜、口红、俄罗斯圣经、百元卢布之外，还有必不可少的绿箭口香糖，其实库布里克在这里应该是纯粹的恶搞，他绝对是故意的，当时飞机上的口香糖其实并不是绿箭，而是经过官方改良的咖啡因口香糖，在其中加入了大量咖啡因来提神，一天最多只能嚼三四片，为了防止士兵过量服用，甚至还在其中加入了苦涩的药味，而飞机上温度很高，这些口香糖易融化，因而往往保存在铁盒子里。

库布里克这里使用的口香糖是去除实用功能的，而仅仅是最为一种烘托战争氛围，联想起二战的点缀，因而他使用了当时家喻户晓而广受欢迎的绿箭口香糖，作为一种战争明信片的使用方式。

3.手中紧攥的救命稻草——执行官Mandrake的口香糖记忆

Mandrake和上司Ripper共处一室时，与叼着烟斗泾渭分明的姿态是紧紧攥着手中的绿箭口香糖，显出弱小且无助的克制与挣扎，绿箭口香糖在这里也是一种联想起二战记忆的点缀，它像是一根招魂的指挥棒，将办公室变成了战场。

从后面的叙述中，我们获悉了Mandrake的二战回忆，他被日本人在铁路线旁抓住，凌受了非人的虐待。

他们甚至不想让他说话，只是疯狂地虐待他，以凌辱他取乐，这也在一定程度上解释了他的娘娘腔气质。因而他在45分48秒，面对着手中紧攥的绿箭口香糖，脑子里大概一遍遍地过着二战时期被日本人抓住虐待的可怕场景，因而他面容里深藏的恐惧与挣扎也就不难解释了，更过分的是他在冷战时期也遭到了上司的威胁与囚禁，这种二重复演无疑是一种酷刑的酷刑，那根绿箭口香糖着实残忍。

4.不，这是你的绿箭——Buck向身边的官员递上绿箭被拒

当然，最后的最后，我们也不能忘记可口可乐在影片中所做出的的牺牲，它起到的作用与绿箭口香糖相似，但在表达的功能和张力上不及绿箭，因而也只是在片中出现了一次，作为从主线宕开的传神一笔。

奇爱博士是谁？美国政府雇用的高级科研人员，负责研发用于冷战的高尖端核武器以及相关的一系列攻击防御系统。一个德裔美国人。一个笼罩在阴影中的瘫子，坐轮椅的。一个右手戴着黑色皮手套行动不正常的人。一个混入美国政府的纳粹余孽。一个被恶魔控制的人。是的，恶魔。正如恰达耶夫不是思想，而是一种精神，被恶魔控制的精神。纳粹，共产党，苏维埃，美国精神，资本主义，爱国主义统统都是恶魔。它们宣扬一种仇恨，弱肉强食，优胜劣汰的仇恨。以崇拜强权的名义宣扬的一种仇恨。它们管这叫爱。爱国，爱领袖云云。所以国家要强大，搞核竞赛，压倒敌人。领袖要造神，万能，完美无缺，字字皆真理。
一个阳痿的自大狂，一个被训练过度的飞行员（核战英雄？牛仔帽暗示什么？），一个在地球表面被核辐射笼罩后，躲在地下矿井里仍要藏起一颗核弹与苏联继续竞赛的美国将军，一个陷入泥潭，无能为力的美国总统，一个研发出毁灭世界的机器的国家政权。影片中，一切荒诞的，可笑的，恐怖的，都是恶魔受到人类崇拜后的产物。
现在冷战结束了，纳粹早完蛋了，苏联也解体了。那么我们是否可以以较为轻松的心情来看这部电影呢？我觉得不大可能。因为影片中表现的一切细节，现在依然成立。

我说这是最经典的反战电影难道会有人反对吗？本片讲述了一个幻想的核战争的到来，库布里克却以黑色幽默的态度诠释了这场荒淫的闹剧，令人捧腹，战争果真是可笑的！奇爱博士的“杜撰名字”和不自觉的纳粹军礼，战争狂人杰克将军的“纯净体液”，疯狂的巴克将军，戴着牛仔帽坐在核弹上冲向目标的康格上校，苏联的“世界末日装置”以及用《当约翰尼胜利回家》衬托的R计划，无不对比鲜明地充满对核战争，人类未来，无知的政治统治的浓浓的讽刺意味。
奇思妙想与黑色幽默漫天飞舞，充满暗喻的台词令人捧腹，密闭空间里将政治的各种疯狂偏执自私无知进行放大，滑稽而夸张的表演更是将战争的荒谬和冷战的荒诞推向极致，浓郁的讽刺充斥在每一个细节之中。世界毁灭之前依旧在算计利益的结局拍案叫绝，剑走偏锋的另类喜剧！