时间旅行者的妻子

我害怕走在人潮拥挤的地方 你知道那样会更孤单 离开的时候我们都一样难过 很久很久以后也同样感动 你在那里 看着流星 一道一道划过这里 没有距离 我们的心慢慢靠近 时间旅行 在我的天地 感受着彼此的呼吸 一直在身边 从没走远 等待 牵着手走过洒满星光的街头 我知道那感觉更自由 离开的时候我们也不怕寂寞 未来的路口 我们静静等候

你愿不愿意 这样的等一个人。你愿不愿意 等这样的一个人。

他看上去有一点邋遢，却总是肆意的闯进你的生活里。

6岁那年，他借走了你本用来野餐的毛毯。他说自己是身不由己的时间旅行者，他说你们是朋友，在你长大以后。阳光好美，你需要抬起头才看得见他褐色深邃的眸。然后，在你选择相信的那一秒，这个男人，伴着阳光，就那么一点一点的消失了。

等待 就是从那时候开始的吧。

12岁的时候，你开始嫉妒他的妻子，他笑着对你说他很爱她。15岁的时候，他神经兮兮的吻了你，在你给了他一个耳光之后。18岁生日的那天，你终于成为了他的女人。

他叫Henry，这一秒还在下一秒就消失的Henry。而你是Claire，那个永远都在等待Henry回来的Claire。

你说 "I‘ve been waiting for Henry my entire life ".

可他却说"I can't stay"。你明明知道的。

你知道他亲眼目睹了母亲的车祸，你知道他这么多年一直都好痛苦，

你知道他混乱的过去 无可避免的未来，你知道他什么都没有。

可你还是这么一直的等。等到连他也忍不住要问你"why？ why do you like me？"

"Because you are my perfect guy."

因为你知道，这个叫Henry的男人是怎样的爱着你。因为你知道，即使他在你的生命中来来回回，可是爱情，从未走散。

It's you.Henry.

“谢谢你，让我在最美好的年华里，遇见你。谢谢你，给我的所有温暖 和回忆。”



——For "The Time Traveler's Wife"

尽管我现在还不认识你, 但我感觉我已经认识你一辈子了. 从你还是一个六岁的姑娘, 穿着花裙子, 独自到草坪上野餐的时候. 虽然是第一次见面,你可爱的笑容已经打动了我. 我们第一次拉手, 彼此已经交换了信任和好感.

我还记得我们第二个 "初次见面", 或许是在人潮汹涌的地铁里, 或许是在学校的图书馆, 你傻傻的盯着我热情的向我打招呼, 并邀请我去我最喜欢的那家餐馆吃饭. 虽然我们素未蒙面, 但你嘴角美丽的笑容让我没办法拒绝, 我知道我们将是完美的一对.

我们会幸福的生活在一起, 即使没遇到你之前我的房间非常邋遢, 甚至在我的洗脸架里面藏着我那个的时候需要的润滑液. 我会在和你一起生活的柴米油盐中逐渐学会生命的意义 --- 我会学会和渐渐疏远的长辈分享自己生活中的点点滴滴, 我已经能感觉到对母亲说一句我爱你是那么的幸福; 我会更进一步理解爱情的忠诚, 在每一次进厨房后你从我带回的超市袋中取出面包的瞬间, 你我都那么相爱; 我能体会女儿诞生过程中你受的艰辛; 我甚至开始理解多年未联系的父亲对已故的母亲那浓浓的思念, 当然还有你那个最开始一点都不喜欢我的哥哥, 现在我们已经是很好的哥们儿了...... 最重要的是, 即使在我生命的最后一刻, 我仍然会重复那句我说过很多次的话, I love you, more than anything.

我们在一起的日子里, 我们会和其他人一样, 有欢笑, 有争吵. 我有时候甚至会大男子主义的撒手而去, 让你孤独一人在家度过圣诞和新年. 但是我是爱你的, 我愿意在冷冷的雪天里坐在你单位外的椅子上等你下班然后向你道歉, 我知道你看到我认错的诚恳你就会原谅我.

我们在一起的日子里, 我们可能会和其他人一样, 想买好看的衣服, 想要更大的工作室和房子, 买辆更漂亮的车. 相信我, 我会用别人不具备的能力为你赚到它们的.

我们在一起的日子里, 我们也要和其他人一样, 生一个英俊的大胖子或者美艳的小妞, 这样我们的屋子里会多出一份笑声, 你也一定会喜欢的.

在遇到你之前, 我内心一直有数不清的想法和孤傲, 看不惯世间各种的丑恶与假善, 但我又必须和其他普通人一样, 茫然又忙碌的活着这个世界上, 更多的是孤独与寂寞.

直到我遇到你, 直到我为你套上戒指的刹那, 直到婚礼上看到你美丽的婚纱. 我爱你, 我未来的妻.



========================================================

后记: 我亲爱的姥姥继1992年我姥爷肝癌去世后, 于2009年9月辞世, 当年她和姥爷也有过一段轰轰烈烈的爱情, 虽然已经成为了历史. 不过在我眼里, 他们之间的爱情和生活从未消失, 一切都还在那片绿绿的草原上上演着呢.

自始至尾都以非常平静的心情看这部电影，直到电影的最后，看到女主角一路狂奔，奔到原本已经死去的丈夫面前，俩人紧紧相拥的画面，我的眼眶还是忍不住湿润了。

时空旅行的能力没有想象中的那么好玩，这种能力折磨着对过去有无限遗憾和悔恨的能力者，也折磨着能力者的爱人。时空旅行者的妻子从恋爱时期开始就必须习惯恋人的长期失踪和突然降临。

电影最后的最后，短暂的相聚后他还是在她面前消失了，她像往常一样冷静地收拾好摊在地上的刚刚还穿在他身上的衣服，拥着女儿回家去。
“我一直觉得好像他就躲在周围，随时准备出来给我们一个惊喜”。女儿这样说。
原著中丈夫写给妻子的诀别情书电影里没有体现固然可惜，但我觉得这样的结局也很好。
一直折磨着他们的时空旅行的能力，这时也成为一种礼物。虽然他已经去世了，但是说不定哪一天，曾经年轻的他穿越时空来到现在的自己面前，就像以前一样，突然消失一段时间之后，总会回来的。心里对生活依然有期待，有相聚的幸福即使很短暂，就像丈夫还陪在身边一样。

他一直说：我不想让你等。
殊不知，女人不怕等，怕只怕你走了就再也不回来。
女人一辈子都在等。等他的出现，等他跟自己约会，等他向自己求婚，等他的吻，等他下班，等他回家，等他成熟，等他懂得珍惜自己，等他回心转意……
这些女人都等得了。她爱你就能用一辈子来等你。
只是请你不要永远不回来。


所以，当克莱尔喜极地投入本来已经死去的亨利的怀抱中时。我真的高兴得想哭了。
细细回味整个故事整部电影，你就会发现这是一段很平淡很平淡，但是很伟大的爱情。

用原著中亨利写给克莱尔的诀别情书中的很感人的一段作为结尾：

克莱尔，我想再次告诉你，我爱你。这些年来，我们之间的爱，一直是汪洋的苦海中指航的明灯，是高空钢索步行者身下的安全网，是我怪诞生活中惟一的真实，惟一的信任。今晚我觉得，我对你的爱，比我自己，更紧紧地抓着这个世界：仿佛在我之后，我的爱还可以留下来，包围你，追随你，抱紧你。


我想，这也正是最隽永的，超越生死的感情。

i met a girl. 亨利坐在破旧的地铁车厢，搓着手，忐忑并满怀希翼的对面前的这位女士如是说。她是亨利30多年前还在世的母亲，时光荏苒，上天竟然会如此眷顾一个人，让他可以回溯到过去的时光和逝去的亲人对话，虽然面前的她并不知道，亨利临走时和她母亲的最后一句话是，你的儿子非常的爱您。树欲静而风不止。



i met a girl 这一年，亨利36岁，克莱尔6岁。郎骑竹马来，虽然在这个轮回里，克莱尔的白马王子没有脚踏七彩祥云甚至穿的像模像样来见克莱尔一面，相反确是以一种荒诞狼狈的状态下见面，却丝毫没有减轻一丝这个人日后在克莱尔心目中的分量，或许在跨越了数十年的风尘仆仆的时空中相遇，其他的已经不复重要。在冥冥中降临的那一瞬，伟大的造物主也许饶有兴趣的看着他的杰作微微一晒。



i met a girl 这一年，亨利28岁，克莱尔20岁。杜拉斯说，爱之于我，并非肌肤之亲，一蔬一饭，它是一种不死的欲望，是疲惫生活里面的英雄梦想。这是一个视爱情重于生命的疯狂女人。所幸的是，生命中这样的人不是她一个。亨利对克莱尔说，假如说这个世界上还有什么能让我割舍不下，那就是你，你愿意嫁给我吗？虽然是一个怪胎，但依然不失获得真挚爱情的机会。爱情如果没有变得简单，是因为爱的还不够深。



i met a girl 这一年亨利31岁，克莱尔23岁，他们终于走到了一起，这是一段时空交错的爱情，即使在典礼当天，亨利也不知所踪，但这是他人生中最为珍贵的时间，即使是在十年之后，他依然行色匆匆来到这一天，只为了履行那一句不离不弃生死相依的，我愿意。



i met a girl 这是亨利生命中数不胜数的时光穿越中最为欣喜的一次，在这里，他遇到了10岁的女孩，阿尔吧，她的女儿。在克莱尔受孕失败数次后，心灰意冷的他得知了这个消息。前几天，我的小侄女刚出生，我去医院看到过这样一个神奇的小生命，这是造物主的杰作，感谢他让人类生生不息。



i met a girl 这一年，她82岁，他43岁。假如在世界上，还有什么可以阻止他们。那只有他们自己，跨越了时间，生命的界限的爱情，是永生的。



i met a girl 你我同岁。但却对爱情有着截然不同的看法，这导致我们的人生在一段不短的交集之后逐渐渐行渐远。这不用归咎于孰是孰非，只是不知道你会不会懂得，在片尾逐渐消逝的字幕面前，我就如同看到我们彼此所共同享有的回忆逐寸斑驳而默然。茕茕白兔，东奔西顾，衣不如新，人不如故。



i met a girl 但那都不曾是你。



后记：这是从去年3月的瑞典电影血色入侵以来最为精彩的一部电影。和小说一起看的，互为补充。强烈推荐。

《时间旅行者的妻子》可以说是我最爱的一本书，还特意买了英文原版来看。书中所描述的复杂的人性，艺术家的灵动，和跨越时间的爱以及对音乐，诗歌等等主题的探讨都让我魂牵梦绕。可以说，原著作者将生活琐事都描写的非常具有艺术性。
可是！！！看来电影以后非常失望。首先，克莱尔和书中描写完全不一样。没有艺术家的那种气质，没有克莱尔那种不守规矩却又温润的感觉。最基本的，克莱尔的头发怎么不是书中描写的颜色？中年后怎么居然剪短发了？编剧难道没有看过书中描写，“亨利甚至认为我的头发具有独立的人格”吗？
其次，贯穿全书的一些关键人物和元素都没有出现。金太，露西尔（克莱尔的妈妈），英格丽德，贯穿全书的诗歌，那首经典的“world enough， and time(世界够大，时间够多）”全部都没有。这些元素本来使人物更加丰满，让我们更加理解他们的爱和世界，透过那些诗歌也更加理解这本书，以及永恒的爱的主题。
此外，编剧只是流水账一般的叙述故事，对原著的删改可以说是到了去其精华取其糟粕的程度。爱尔芭按照书中的描写，应该是跟亨利非常相似，黑发聪慧的小女孩，可电影中竟然是金发！在遇到克莱尔之前，亨利混乱的生活也仅仅以一只口红带过。过最另人无法忍受的是，编剧竟然篡改了结尾，去掉了经典的遗书和克莱尔82岁时的相遇。少了这一点，这个故事还怎么能体现“时间算不了什么”？
少了这些诗歌，艺术，人物，甚至还可以加上美食，整个故事被篡改的面目全非，深度全无，而变成了一个毫无深度和艺术性的老套爱情悲剧。

很久没有看到一部使我感动到掉泪的爱情电影，我想了又想回味了又再回味，这一切都关乎于那些似乎存在又似乎只是幻想的情结，

是的，或许每个女人都希望自己是克莱尔，都幻想着在自己还是孩童时遇见的某个男人会是自己命中注定的男人，会幻想现在所经历的一切只是为了遇见那个男人。说到底，女人都过于相信宿命。
我想robert schwentke也是。

我感动得点是在于，唏嘘原来所有人都没有能力改变宿命，所有的一切在冥冥之中早已设定好。我喜欢这样的宿命论。我竟然是这样一个宿命控。

因为我爱你，所以命运让多年后的我遇见多年前的你，因为我爱你，现在的你会义无反顾的爱上现在一无所知的我，因为我爱你，我会一直等待那个消失的你。所有的一切，只是因为我爱你。无论命运怎么安排，我还是爱你，我还是会在一个时间拥抱你，我还是会坐在草地上等待你，一生耗尽，只因我爱你。

原谅我，我是多么希望这样一种充满了宿命色彩的爱情，我是多么相信一直有那么一个人会是我的命中注定就想片中男女主角一样。

无论生活如何，我们都需要一些美好的梦想。正如一切也不过是场美梦，一场只关于我爱你的梦。

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.


Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.